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Origin

Info:

Amembassy TEL AVIV

1052

INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES / 350

EXDIS

Deptel 957 to Tel Aviv REF:

Buenos Aires 1776 to Department

Embassy requested approach Foreign Minister Eban to state we have now received AEC team report and wish thank GOI for our opportunity visit Israeli atomic installations March 31-April 4. Embassy should state we are in general satisfied by what team saw. However, we are concerned by fact Israeli technical personnel could supply no information about Argentine-Israeli transactions of uranium concentrate. We understand substantial deliveries from Argentina have in fact occurred and that the undertaking that the uranium will be used for peaceful purposes. There are no provisions for safeguards requiring reports, inspections, and other verifications equivalent to IAEA safeguards system.

2) To avoid possibility casting shadow of doubt on generally satisfactory results from visit, we would hope Israel could clarify question of whereabouts in Israel of Argentine uranium concentrate and use to which it being or intended be put. Embassy should state this is precisely type of problem which augments apprehension in high levels USG and elsewhere /proliferation and underscores need for IAEA type safeguards to

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

Raymond A. Hare (H)

NEA: NE: ANNyerges av 6/1/66

2700

ARA - Mr. Klebanoy (é INR - Mr. Spain Cel

SCI - Mr. Zook (e huy colly ACDA - Mr. DePalma Ce 2

- Mr. Symmes

AEC - Mr. Dalton (info s/s - Mr. Walsh

NEA - Mr. Davies

ACDA - Mr. Rochlin & 4 SECRET

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reassure world of peaceful orientation Israel nuclear program. This is subject we plan take up with G@I further in near future. Embassy should recall the Secretary's statement to Eban February 9 that Israel was apparently following a policy designed to create ambiguity in the Arab world, that this also created ambiguity in Washington and Israel should expect the US to be extremely clear and utterly harsh on non-proliferation GP-3

END

BALL.

FORM DS-322A 8-63 DS-322A CONTINUATION SHEET SECRET

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